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Abstract. Throughout his life, Leibniz showed serious interest in the 
construction of clocks and actively contributed to their technical 
improvement. He described the mechanical and especially the pendulum 
clock as a paradigmatic kind of machine, and therefore as a suitable model for 
exploring the nature and boundaries of mechanistic philosophy. After an 
overview on Leibniz‟s technology and physics of clocks (Section 1), this paper 
reviews the main occurrences of the clock analogy in his philosophical 
writings. Section 2 considers the epistemological use of the clock analogy and 
its evolution from an early stress on the hypothetical component of natural 
science to a later concern with the full inspectability and intelligibility of 
natural processes. Section 3 details the manifold uses of the clock analogy in 
metaphysics to illustrate features of the world, of both inanimate and living 
bodies, and even of God, the soul, and the soul-body union. The possibility 
of construing machine metaphors in terms of either structure or function 
solves the apparent ambivalence of Leibniz‟s approach to the clock analogy. It 
also explains his persistent reference to perfection and standards of 
perfection, thereby bringing to the fore the teleological strand of this concept. 
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1. The nature of clocks 
In Leibniz‟s writings,1 clocks and watches often appear along with mills as 
paradigmatic kinds of machines. For instance, the New Essays claim that “a sentient or 
thinking being is not a mechanical thing like a watch or a mill.”2 This proximity 
notwithstanding, clocks are sometimes described as antithetical to mills from the 
mechanical point of view, insofar as their construction pursues the opposite aim than 
that of mills. Whereas the mechanics of mills aims to accelerate a machine‟s motion, 
the constructor of a clock strives above all to obtain slowness and regularity.3 The 
motion of clocks must be minimal in order to prolong their endurance, but it must be 
as regular as possible for the sake of exactitude. Endurance and exactitude thus jointly 
constitute the main standard of a clock‟s perfection: the longer and more correctly a 
clock can tell the time without needing repair or resetting, the more perfect it is. This 
paper argues that the possibility of ascribing degrees of perfection to clocks and 
mechanical timepieces in general is crucial to understanding Leibniz‟s various (and 
sometimes prima facie inconsistent) uses of the clock analogy. 
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The technology of Leibniz‟s day offered two types of devices to make clock 
hands move uninterruptedly and regularly: pendulum and spring-driven clocks. As the 
ongoing publication of his technical writings confirms with ever more evidence, 
Leibniz took a serious interest in the construction of both sorts of clocks and actively 
contributed to improving the mechanism of the latter.4 As early as 1675, he was able 
to announce his invention of a new “principle of exactitude” for portable timepieces.5 
Some 40 years later, he could still remember the circumstances of this early 
publication. Indeed, after reading the manuscript of Henry Sully‟s treatise on clocks, 
he wrote some remarks in which he evoked various 1670s discoveries and polemics, 
regretted not seeing his invention realized, and described the state of the art 
concerning both kinds of clocks.6 
In accepting the division of artificial clocks into the two classes of pendulum 
and spring-driven devices, Leibniz also makes clear that he considers the distinction 
not merely conventional but dependent upon the actual, essential properties of each 
device. Against Locke‟s claim that there are different species of clocks only insofar as 
we introduce different names to distinguish them, Leibniz maintains that the various 
differences that we can identify in clocks – such as “the varieties of contrivance 
[artifice] and in particular how the balances differ”7 – in fact constitute different 
species. Of course, this realist stance towards types of artefact is in keeping with 
Leibniz‟s overall realism about natural kinds, but it also manifests the profound unity 
between the natural and artificial realms, as both are governed by the same forces and 
laws. Artificial pendulums and springs exploit the gravity and elasticity of bodies 
respectively, which the young Leibniz explains as two related phenomena that both 
result from a common cause, the circular motion of ether.8 Together, gravity and 
elasticity provide the motive principles of not only all artificial but also all natural 
machines.9 
The affinity from the point of view of physics between the natural and 
artificial worlds is the ground of Leibniz‟s use of the clock metaphor in both 
metaphysical and epistemological contexts.10 Since clocks are typical machines, they 
can serve as a model not only for investigating the essential features of machines such 
as living bodies or the world itself, but also for reflecting on our epistemic relation to 
them. Let us begin with this latter issue. 
 
2. The epistemology of clockwork 
2.1. Hermetic clocks 
The dependence of clocks and artefacts upon the fundamental forces and 
laws of nature has an epistemic counterpart in the dependence of technology upon 
physical science. Since the functioning of clocks depends on natural forces, the 
invention of the former requires knowledge of the latter. Leibniz considered 
Huygens‟s invention of the pendulum clock emblematic in this respect, as it basically 
consisted in the rigorous application of Galileo‟s scientific discoveries about the 
“remarkable properties of pendulums.”11 Leibniz is aware that primitive pendulum 
clocks were reportedly constructed even earlier, but he insists that Huygens must be 
credited as the actual inventor of this device, since he was the first to know the 
scientific reason for the pendulum‟s regularity.12 
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For the same reason, useful inventions such as clocks should be regarded as 
“the mark of true science” like Galilean science;13 by contrast, the sterility of Cartesian 
philosophy in terms of technological progress is evoked to cast doubt on its 
soundness. According to Leibniz‟s rhetoric – if not to his actual intellectual practice – 
the invention of devices is neither a purely empirical discovery nor the outcome of 
mere speculation, but rather the fruit of scientific knowledge of the inner mechanisms 
of nature. The question, however, arises of how this knowledge is to be acquired. 
From the early 1670s onwards, Leibniz frequently addresses this and other 
epistemological questions by means of the clock metaphor. On the other hand, the 
meaning of this metaphor appears to vary considerably from Leibniz‟s early to his 
middle and late years, as though his sojourn in Paris (1672–1676) marked a divide 
even in his use of mechanistic imagery. 
In Leibniz‟s writings from the early 1670s, nature is compared with a clock in 
order to clarify the concept of hypothesis and stress the difference between 
hypotheses and observations. Nature appears as a closed clock with an inner structure 
that is therefore inscrutable. Imagine that you are led to admire a newly invented clock 
and asked by its maker to guess how it is made simply by observing its visible 
motions.14 You are allowed neither to open the clock case nor to touch it, let alone 
turn it around. Natural philosophers are often in a similar epistemic situation with 
respect to the objects of their investigation, as they try to explain phenomena without 
having access to the inner structures that produce them: 
 
Indeed, almost all the ingenious philosophers who even in our century 
participated in deducing the inner nature of corporeal things [...] have 
followed the path that a man could use if, led to a clock, he could not open it, 
turn it around, or touch it, and was nevertheless asked to conjecture 
something about the inner structure and the reason of motion from the 
progress of the clock hand that he would see, or from the sound of the bell 
that he would hear.15 
 
In such cases, the only alternative to scrutability consists in forging 
hypotheses, in devising a possible cause of the effects observed: “If he is an expert at 
automata, he would devise something such that, once it is admitted or even realized, 
all that he perceives from outside the clock would also happen; which is the kind of 
possible supposed cause that philosophers call hypothesis.”16 
Hypotheses are surrogates of observation-based explanations. Forging a 
hypothesis corresponds, in the clock analogy, to constructing an ersatz machine that 
performs the same observable operations carried out by the original, inscrutable 
device. The comparison, however, also highlights the shortcomings of the 
hypothetical method, since there is no guarantee that the contrived mechanism (i.e. 
the hypothesis) really corresponds to the actual clock (i.e. the internal structure of 
nature), even though both bring about the same results. Leibniz adds, however, that a 
hypothesis can be deemed reliable if its predictions are confirmed: 
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If an automata maker leads me to a clock he constructed and asks me to guess 
its construction, perhaps I can exhibit a construction that performs the same 
[function] as the clock on display, since the same phenomena can be 
produced in several ways, but I cannot determine the precise way used by the 
craftsman unless the work is dismantled. However, if a hypothesis not only 
satisfies present experiments but also provides some non-deceptive prediction 
about the future, we must firmly rely on it.17 
 
By contrast, the purely observational approach, free from hypotheses, is 
viable where causal links are fully exposed so that there is no need to devise inner 
structures and one can simply reason from phenomena. This epistemic situation is 
compared with observing a solar clock: 
 
For instance, if after being led to a clock, one sees that the place is illuminated 
by the sun and that an opaque body placed against its light produces a shadow 
which falls on the hour‟s number, certainly he cannot reasonably move to 
contrive other causes than those he sees or to invent I don‟t know what 
progress of an insensible body casting a shadow here and there.18 
 
The world, however, is more like a hermetic clock than a sundial. Due to the 
limited extent of our present knowledge, cosmological hypotheses about the entire 
world machine might even be premature: “[...] we still do not know enough about this 
world clock, as much as a perfect hypothesis requires.”19 
 
2.2. Uncovered clocks 
In his middle and later years, Leibniz evokes clocks as a model of mechanistic 
intelligibility when arguing against occult qualities. In two major works, he famously 
makes fun of the forms and qualities invoked by scholastic philosophy and traditional 
medicine by stressing how ridiculous it would be to explain a clock‟s functioning in 
terms of some “horodictic” quality.20 It is not yet enough, however, to simply say with 
Boyle that nature is mechanism, nor is it enough to replace occult qualities with the 
generic mention of a mechanical cause: “So, for example, in explaining a clock, it is 
not sufficient to say that it is driven by a mechanical principle [ratio] unless you 
distinguish whether it is driven by a weight or by a spring.”21 Here, the clock analogy 
actually serves to point to the shortcomings of some popular versions of the 
mechanistic doctrine. We still need to know, however, why the clock specifically – 
even more than the mill – appears so suitable for denouncing the explanatory gaps 
and limits of old and new physical theories. 
As hinted at above, the artificial clock sets a standard of intelligibility. Imagine 
the clock case is now open so that you can inspect all its wheels and workings. Once 
you are perfectly acquainted with its inner structure, you necessarily understand how it 
works to bring about its intended effects: typically, the periodic clock‟s strokes. 
Scientific explanations meet this standard only insofar as they derive natural 
phenomena from their causes as intelligibly as the clock‟s strokes can be derived from 
its mechanical construction: 
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First of all, I take it to be certain that all things come about through certain intelligible 
causes, or causes which we could perceive if some angel wished to reveal them to us. [...] Let 
us imagine, therefore, that some angel comes to explain to me the true cause 
of magnetic declination and the periods observed in it. He will surely not 
really satisfy me by saying that this is the nature of the magnet or that there is 
a certain sympathy or a kind of soul in the magnet by which it happens. 
Rather he must explain some cause to me, such that, if I understand it, I can 
see that the phenomena follow from it as necessarily as the cause of the 
hammer stroke when a given time has elapsed follows from my knowledge of 
a clock.22 
 
Thus, the very point of the clock analogy (in its epistemological use) 
apparently shifts after the Paris years from stressing the hypothetical character of 
scientific theories to illustrating the conditions of their acceptability. Leibniz appears 
more confident that natural phenomena can be explained in terms of inner structures 
that are observed and not merely hypothetically reconstructed. To some extent at 
least, the case of the horologium mundi is no longer unfathomable but can be opened for 
inspection. 
 
3. The metaphysics of clockwork 
3.1. World 
Although the young Leibniz might have doubted whether we could specify 
the construction details of the world machine, he had no doubt that the world could 
be aptly described as a machine. In the late 1660s and early 1670s, the world-as-clock 
analogy already proves its metaphysical relevance and displays its powerful imagery.23 
However, the artificial clock is evoked by the young Leibniz not only as an 
emblem of the mechanistic worldview but also as an illustration of finalism. Just as it 
would be highly implausible (though not absolutely impossible) for a clock to be the 
product of chance and not of an intelligent maker, we have moral certainty that the 
world is ruled by providence.24 As the focus shifts from the clock‟s structure to its 
artefactual character, the interpretation of the clock metaphor shifts from mechanism 
to finalism, and the world appears as a divine artefact or horologium Dei: “[...] there is in 
fact no wisdom in nature and no appetite; yet a beautiful order arises in it because it is 
the timepiece of God.”25 
Banishing soul-like entities from physics, mechanism deprives nature of any 
knowledge, instinct, or appetite. It thereby provides support to artefactualism, the 
doctrine that nature and natural beings are God‟s artefacts, for if nature is not self-
ordering, it must be ordered by an external agent. In Leibniz‟s use, the world-as-clock 
metaphor shows how deeply mechanistic necessity and finalistic harmony are actually 
intertwined. In their search for material causes, modern physicists “neglect rational 
causes, although the creator‟s wisdom shines out chiefly in that he set up the world 
clock in such a way that afterwards everything would ensue as if by a sort of necessity 
for the greatest harmony of all beings.”26 
In the late 1670s and early 1680s, on the other hand, Leibniz tends to 
emphasize the deterministic aspect of artificial clocks as devices whose behaviour is 
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entirely predictable from their structures and initial conditions. In this vein, he uses 
the clock analogy instead to denounce the necessitarian implications of extreme 
mechanism, which leads one to believe that everything in the universe happens “with 
automatic necessity, just like in a clock,” whereas “the middle path is to consider God 
not only as the first principle and not only as a free agent.”27 
By contrast, to consider God only as the first principle would mean to 
conceive of him as part of the world machine, just as the clock‟s motor is part of the 
clock. The clock metaphor becomes dangerous when it is extended beyond the 
world‟s boundaries to include its creator. This explains Leibniz‟s use of the world-as-
clock analogy to cast a sinister light on the Neo-Stoic doctrine that God is the soul of 
the world: “The sect of the new Stoics believes [...] that God is the soul of the world 
[...], that he is the cause of matter itself, if you wish, but that a blind necessity 
determines him to act; for this reason, he will be to the world what the spring or the 
weight is to a clock.”28 The best antidote to this radical naturalism and its denial of 
final causes consists in maintaining, with Anaxagoras, that the world must be 
produced by an intelligent being, since everything in it is as perfect as possible.29 As 
Margaret Wilson once pointed out, perfection joins value and purpose as key elements 
in Leibniz‟s response to necessitarianism and Spinozism.30 
The concept of perfection is also the theoretical core of Leibniz‟s late 
construal of the world-as-clock analogy in his polemics against Newtonian 
metaphysical cosmology. Leibniz holds to a principle of conservation to the effect that 
the total amount of force in the world remains constant, in spite of local variations 
and redistributions caused by the interactions of bodies. Thus, he strenuously opposes 
Newton‟s claim that the world is gradually losing its motive force and would 
eventually stop like a dead clock if God did not intervene to wind it up.31 
Nevertheless, Leibniz is willing to follow the Newtonian rhetoric in comparing the 
relation between God and the world to the relation between clockmaker and clock, 
for he thinks that he can turn that comparison to his own advantage. Indeed, he had 
previously used the very same comparison in the late 1690s when arguing against the 
occasionalist account of the laws of nature and its postulation of continual 
interventions by God. Bad clockmakers are bound to adjust their work, but God is 
not: 
 
One should not think that nature obeys God‟s command just as the subjects 
obey a promulgated edict, or that God always keeps it on track as though it 
tended to derail, and corrects his work just as bad automata makers usually 
do; but rather that God, when giving laws, also gave to things the force and 
tendency to observe them, in which consists the nature of entelechies.32 
 
By virtue of both the conservation principles of force and direction 
respectively,33 Leibniz‟s system of the universe is causally closed even with respect to 
God – except, of course, for God‟s continuous and unvarying concurrence.34 As a 
perpetual pendulum, the world is by no means independent from its maker. On the 
contrary, it has been made so perfect that no subsequent correction or change is 
needed. By contrast, the machine of Newton‟s world is afflicted by manifold 
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imperfections. Against Clarke‟s denial, Leibniz insists that the world‟s gradual loss of 
its force must count as a defect. His argument draws on the clock analogy: “However, 
that which would make the machine of the world as imperfect as that of an unskillful 
watchmaker [mauvais horloger] surely must necessarily be an imperfection [defaut].”35 
Leibniz uses the clock metaphor to highlight that Newton‟s wind-up world in 
fact requires a variety of divine interventions.36 Not only must God periodically wind 
up his creation, he also has to clean dirt from the mechanism and even repair some of 
its parts: 
 
According to [Newton‟s and his followers‟] doctrine, God Almighty needs to 
wind up his watch from time to time, otherwise it would cease to move. He 
had not, it seems, sufficient foresight to make it a perpetual motion. No, the 
machine of God‟s making is so imperfect, according to these gentlemen, that 
he is obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordinary concourse, and 
even to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work; he must consequently be so 
much the more unskillful a workman as he is more often obliged to mend his 
work and to set it right.37 
 
When Clarke replies that God‟s continual intervention manifests his glory and 
not his imperfection because he did not merely put together the parts of the world but 
created it in its entirety, Leibniz rebuts the argument as inconclusive.38 Consider 
timepieces once again. When you buy a timepiece, you are not primarily interested in 
whether its maker made all of its parts by herself. What really matters to you as the 
timepiece buyer is whether the device is working properly and will continue to do so, 
regardless of the origin of its components: 
 
He who buys a watch does not mind whether the workman made every part 
of it himself, or whether he got the several parts made by others and only put 
them together – provided the watch goes right [comme il faut]. And if the 
workman had received from God even the gift of creating the matter of the 
wheels, yet the buyer of the watch would not be satisfied, unless the workman 
had also received the gift of putting them well together. In like manner, he 
who will be pleased with God‟s workmanship cannot be so without some 
other reason than that which the author had here advanced.39 
 
What is at stake here is what criterion to consider when assessing the 
perfection of an artefact and consequently the level of craftsmanship of its maker, for 
the same criterion should apply to the perfection of the world and the excellence of its 
creator. Whereas Clarke‟s focus is on the production of the single components, which 
amounts to privileging the maker‟s causal power, Leibniz‟s holistic approach puts the 
arrangement of the parts first, thereby exalting the maker‟s mastery of his craft: “The 
true and principal reason why we commend a machine is rather based on the effects 
of the machine than on its cause. We do not inquire so much about the power of the 
artist [puissance du machiniste] as we do about his skill in his workmanship [artifice].”40 If 
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the world is a divine artefact, the excellence of its creator cannot be assessed merely in 
terms of his productive power or causal efficiency: 
 
[...] the reason why God exceeds any other artisan [machiniste] is not only 
because he makes the whole, whereas all other artisans [artisan] must have 
matter to work on. This excellence in God would be only on the account of 
power. [...] The bare production of everything would indeed show the power of 
God but it would not sufficiently show his wisdom. They who maintain the 
contrary will fall exactly into the error of the materialists and of Spinoza, from 
whom they profess to differ. They would, in such case, acknowledge power 
but not sufficient wisdom in the principle of all things.41 
 
By contrast, the clockmaker‟s “artifice” evoked by Leibniz corresponds to 
God‟s wisdom, as distinct from his power. Wisdom provides an independent reason 
for God‟s excellence, as by virtue of wisdom “his machine lasts longer and moves 
more regularly than those of any other artisan whatsoever.”42 
Two main parameters determine a clock‟s perfection: duration and precision. 
Even duration must actually concern the machine‟s state of functioning, since the 
survival of a broken clock, its mere persistence as a material object, cannot be a 
sufficient mark of perfection in Leibniz‟s sense, as something that an average buyer 
would consider a good reason for choosing that clock. After all, a machine‟s lifetime is 
usually identified with the period of its ability to perform its function. Thus, it appears 
that in Leibniz‟s view the perfection of both clocks and worlds is to be evaluated 
according to functional standards. The more a machine is perfect, the less it requires 
assistance or adjustments in order to prolong its lifetime and proper work. 
This suggests a first conclusion. In light of the above, Leibniz‟s adoption of 
the world-as-clock metaphor, usually regarded as the hallmark of mechanism, turns 
out to be committed to a functional and therefore teleological concept of the machine. 
Furthermore, the extension of the clock analogy to express the relation between 
creator and world reveals that teleology and functions may play a crucial role in 
assessing the degrees of perfection of different worlds. 
 
3.2. Living bodies 
A clockwork structure is also typically ascribed by Leibniz to living bodies. In 
their case, however, the application of the clock metaphor is marked by more 
ambivalence. On the one hand, he stresses that analogy so as to foster a fully 
mechanistic account of organic processes.43 When Clarke rejects pre-established 
harmony by arguing that the denial of the soul‟s influence on the body would either 
make human actions supernatural or turn the human being into “as mere a machine as 
a clock,”44 Leibniz does not hesitate to choose the latter but restricts mechanism to 
the body alone: “For man does not act supernaturally, and his body is truly a machine 
acting only mechanically, and yet his soul is a free cause.”45 
Moreover, as Clarke claims that, based on Leibniz‟s concept of miracles, even 
“the generation and formation of plants and animals” should be considered 
miraculous,46 Leibniz insists on the mechanical character of living bodies: “Whatever 
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is performed in the body of man and of every animal is no less mechanical than what 
is performed in a watch. The difference is only such ought to be between a machine 
of divine invention and the workmanship of such a limited artist [ouvrier] a man is.”47 
On the other hand, Leibniz sometimes so stresses the difference as to 
represent clocks as the opposite of living bodies. First, mechanisms per se are not alive 
insofar as they are not animated by a soul. They can imitate living beings, but life 
proper requires perception in the soul; “otherwise it will be only an appearance, like 
the life which the savages in America attributed to watches and clocks.”48 As the soul 
is the only truly unifying principle, clocks also lack genuine substantial unity.49 
Contrasted with unified, animated bodies, mechanical timepieces appear to be 
mere aggregates of extended parts. Thus, they serve as a paradigm of material bodies 
as such: “All bodies have parts, therefore they are no more than heaps or multitudes, 
like a flock of sheep, or a pond full of water drops and fish, or a clockwork full of 
gears and components.”50 This perspective results in grouping artificial machines 
together with inorganic masses. In the New System, both are compared with social and 
natural collective entities and contrasted with natural machines, which alone display a 
true unity: “Such a unity could not occur in the machines made by a craftsman or in a 
simple mass of matter, however organized it may be; such a mass can only be 
considered as an army or a herd, or a pond full of fish, or like a watch composed of 
springs and wheels.”51 
Even natural inorganic materials like salts, minerals, and metals turn out to be 
more similar than living bodies to clocks: 
 
It is true that there appear to be species which are not really unum per se (i.e. 
bodies endowed with a genuine unity, or with an indivisible being which 
makes up their whole active principle), any more than a mill or a watch could 
be. Salts, minerals and metals could be of this nature, that is, simple structures 
[contextures] or masses in which there is some regularity.52 
 
Here, the clock metaphor appears to apply to virtually anything but living 
bodies. Having a regular structure is sufficient to be like a clock but not for being 
alive. Immediately afterwards, however, Leibniz points out that inanimate and 
animated bodies are similar in the respect that the species of each body is sufficiently 
determined by its physical structure, so we can classify any given body without 
considering a soul that might unify it: 
 
But both kinds of bodies, animate bodies as well as lifeless structures 
[contextures sans vie], will fall into species according to their inner constitutions 
[seront spécifiés par la structure intérieure]; since even with the former – the animate 
ones – the soul and the machine is each sufficient by itself to determine [the 
species], since they agree perfectly. [...] Thus, when things are to be ranked 
into species it is useless to dispute about substantial forms.53 
 
Thus, even leaving aside the issue of the unifying principle, some difference 
between living and non-living bodies should be apparent from the bodies 
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themselves.54 How, then, does the inner structure of a living body differ from that of 
lifeless matter and artefacts? Leibniz‟s well-known answer consists in his doctrine of 
natural machines. He maintains that the difference between natural and artificial 
machines is not merely one of degree, as though the former were simply more 
complex than the latter, but an essential one, since it involves the infinite: “We must 
then know that the machines of nature have a truly infinite number of organs [...]. A 
natural machine still remains a machine in its least parts.”55 This is why natural 
machines require “infinite wisdom and power.” 
 
[...] the whole of nature is, so to speak, the workmanship of God [artificium Dei], 
indeed, so much so that any natural machine you may choose consists of a 
completely infinite number of organs (which is the true and insufficiently 
appreciated distinction between the natural and the artificial).56 
 
The difference, however, is not as clear as it appears intuitively. Why should 
the nesting of structures that is typical of natural machines, every part of which is 
itself a smaller machine, not pertain to every kind of body, whether natural or 
artificial, whether living or otherwise? Why not consider the world itself as the top-
level machine whose components are machines down to their smallest parts? After all, 
this corresponds to the mechanistic worldview, as Leibniz himself sometimes 
suggests.57 
In terms of mere structures, it is difficult to establish a clear-cut division 
between natural machines and the rest of the physical world. However, there is a 
precise sense in which artificial machines are not machines down to their smallest 
parts. If we take the term „machine‟ to include in its meaning a functional character, 
then artefacts turn out to be machines only down to a certain level of the analysis of 
wholes into parts. Whereas in a living body all the parts and parts of parts are designed 
to serve the functions of their respective whole, the components of an artefact (e.g., 
the wheels of a clock) are made up of parts that may not themselves be machines. 
Indeed, it is in such functional terms that Leibniz characterizes natural vs. artificial 
machines in Monadology: 
 
Thus each organized body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or 
natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. For a 
machine constructed by man‟s art is not a machine in each of its parts. For 
example, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which, for us, are 
no longer artificial things [qui ne nous sont plus quelque chose d’artificiel], and no 
longer have any marks to indicate the machine for whose use the wheel was 
intended. But natural machines, that is, living bodies, are still machines in 
their least parts, to infinity. That is the difference between nature and art, that 
is, between divine art and our art.58 
 
In saying that the wheel tooth has parts that, “for us, are no longer artificial,” 
Leibniz in fact conflates the artificial and what we would rather term „artefactual‟ (i.e. 
made for some intended purpose). Those parts are said to lack artificiality “for us” 
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insofar as they are not designed for the intended use of the wheel. In functional terms, 
the clock‟s wheels are not composed of further machines, although in merely 
structural terms they presumably are, namely insofar as „machine‟ denotes any 
composite entity, the behaviour of which is entirely determined by its structure and 
the laws of nature.59 Moreover, when Foucher takes Leibnizian unities to be merely 
functional, as clocks are,60 Leibniz vigorously rejects that interpretation. For him, the 
functional unity displayed by a clock is by no means sufficient to constitute a 
substantial unity.61 
Further textual evidence supports this position regarding the functional 
meaning of „machine‟. The incipit of Corpus hominis shows that the functional and 
teleological account of both living bodies and artificial machines was already fully in 
place by the early 1680s. Here, Leibniz uses the clock analogy to argue that every sort 
of machine is best characterized in terms of its function or intended use: 
 
The human body, like the body of any animal, is a sort of machine. Any 
machine, moreover, is best defined in terms of its final cause, so that in the 
description of the parts it is therefore apparent in what way each of them is 
coordinated with the others for the intended use. Thus one who is to describe 
a given clock will say that it is a Machine made to display equal divisions of 
time [...].62 
 
According to this text, each animal body is primarily intended to conserve a 
certain species of machine of perpetual motion. A later text elucidates the functions of 
the human machine by subordinating conservation to the higher end of wisdom: “I 
would think that even the animal‟s anatomy is to be treated by the method of ends, 
e.g., by considering the human body as a machine devised for the sake of propagating 
wisdom, from which [result] both the organs of cognition and the conservation of the 
animal and the species.”63 
With a dash of rational reconstruction, we may distinguish three levels of 
body unification: the structural, the functional, and the substantial. Artificial machines 
such as clocks are both structurally and functionally unified. They share the former 
feature with all natural bodies, for even inanimate matter behaves mechanically and is 
in this respect comparable with a machine. By contrast, inanimate matter has no 
functional unification, although it may of course serve some purpose in the overall 
economy of creation. Functional unification belongs to living bodies down to their 
tiniest parts; it also belongs to artificial machines, but only to the limited extent that 
their parts are designed to contribute to the purpose of the whole. Finally, substantial 
unification is not a strictly physical property, since it is effected by the soul; thus, it 
pertains to animated bodies alone. 
The intermediate position of clocks in the scale of unification explains why 
they can serve as a model for both inorganic and living bodies. Framed from the 
structural point of view, clocks accord with the former, but from the functional point 
of view they are comparable only with the latter. Indeed, it is only by adopting the 
functional and teleological perspective that we can view natural machines as divine 
artefacts. Once again, however, considering the functions and purposes of clocks and 
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bodies evokes the concept of perfection. Qua artefacts, natural machines share the 
standard of perfection that applies to all artefacts (see above); as Leibniz explains to 
Masham, they are designed so as to keep functioning without continual maintenance 
by their maker.64 
 
3.3. God and soul 
Of course, the divine clockmaker is “infinitely more skilled” than any human 
clockmaker,65 but the criteria of excellence are the same for both. In terms of 
precision and regularity, God can even be compared with the clock itself, as Leibniz 
did in 1677. When Nicholas Steno objected that the theological application of the 
principle of sufficient reason would introduce a “mechanical God,” Leibniz warned 
against this “metaphorical expression” but also pointed out its correct interpretation: 
“The sense is that God acts as determinedly as a clock; indeed, even the reason why 
the clock acts determinedly is to be credited to the determined way that God acts, 
namely the most perfect way.”66  
The functional standards of the perfection of clocks are so meaningful to 
Leibniz as to justify the extension of the clock metaphor not only to God but also to 
the human soul: “I have compared the soul with a clock only with regard to the 
regulated precision of its changes, which is only imperfect even in the best clocks, but 
which is perfect in the works of God. And one can say that the soul is a most exact 
immaterial automaton.”67 
This is even more significant when, on the other hand, the soul is expressly 
contrasted with the clock. As noted above, both clocks and mills feature in closely 
related metaphors as examples of fully inspectable machines. Indeed, the comparison 
of clock and soul provides a variant of Leibniz‟s famous mill argument to prove that 
perception cannot be a mechanical process. It is as impossible to find the origin of 
perception in the tiniest structures of living bodies as to find it either “in a watch, 
where the constituent parts of the machine are all visible, or in a mill, where one can 
even walk around among the wheels. For the difference between a mill and a more 
refined machine is only a matter of greater and less.”68 Here again, the ambivalence of 
the mechanical analogy depend on whether machines are considered from the merely 
structural or from the functional point of view. 
 
3.4. Body and soul 
The automatic character that Leibniz ascribes to both soul and body is a 
necessary precondition of pre-established harmony. Leibniz even praises Wolff for 
noting that pre-established harmony can be usefully illustrated by comparing the 
faculties of the soul with the parts of a machine.69 He does not hesitate to interpret 
Locke‟s “uneasiness” as “the disquiet of our clock,” thereby comparing it with the 
restless swing of the clock pendulum.70 
At the same time, that automatic character makes it possible to describe the 
relation between soul and body in terms of two synchronized clocks. From the 1880s 
until only recently, scholars have debated whether the two-clock analogy should be 
traced back to Geulincx (as suggested by Edmund Pfleiderer, who took this alleged 
source as evidence of Leibniz‟s plagiarism from Geulincx) or rather to the Cartesian 
 
 
 
Society and Politics                                                                              Vol. 11, No. 2(22)/November 2017 
167 
milieu.71 In fact, the first to realize the possible application of the clock metaphor to 
Leibniz‟s hypothesis of concomitance was Foucher; chronological evidence suggests 
that his remarks were the immediate source of Leibniz‟s analogy, as even Pfleiderer 
eventually recognized.72 If the soul is conceived as a kind of machine, observes 
Foucher, then prearranging its modifications so that they correspond to the motions 
of the body without there being any causal interaction between them is no more 
impossible for God than making two clocks strike synchronously.73 Thus, the clock 
metaphor provides an argument for maintaining that pre-established harmony is 
possible. 
Leibniz immediately grows fond of this comparison and extends it to all three 
systems of soul-body commerce, which are thus compared with the three possible 
ways of synchronizing two clocks: mutual influence, perpetual maintenance, and 
“natural accord,” which means an accord that follows from the clocks‟ own natures. 
While the terms of the comparison have been widely discussed, there is an aspect that 
has largely been overlooked and has to do with the much debated issue of the 
difference between the occasionalist and harmonist accounts.74 Using the clock 
metaphor, Leibniz often emphasizes that the difference between these two systems 
lies not only in how the creator‟s causal agency is exerted but also in the intrinsic 
qualities of the artefacts. The clocks corresponding to occasional causes are described 
as “bad” precisely because they need perpetual maintenance, “as if a man were 
charged with constantly synchronizing [accorder] two bad [mechantes] clocks which are in 
themselves incapable of agreeing.”75 This is the same argument later advanced against 
Newtonian cosmology; a machine that needs mid-course corrections along the way 
must be defective and thus reveals the inadequate technical skills of its maker. 
By contrast, pre-established clocks are praised as good and accurate. The 
clockmaker makes them “from the outset so accurate and good that they can keep 
together [s’accorder] by their own structure.”76 Accordingly, soul and body are brought 
into harmony with one another “by an exact ordering [reglement] of each of these two 
beings in isolation, such that they can agree in virtue of their own natures, which is the 
most beautiful and the most worthy of God.”77 Pre-established harmony requires 
perfectly functioning and perfectly adjusted machines, such as only the most perfect 
maker can produce.78 
 
4. Conclusions 
Although most of the clock analogies considered so far may not appear 
particularly innovative with respect to the early modern background,79 the full range of 
meanings that they come to cover in Leibniz‟s epistemology and metaphysics is 
impressive. In light of the considerations discussed above, Leibniz‟s use of the clock 
metaphor turns out to be less ambivalent than at first appears; it originates in the 
sheer ambivalence of the early modern concept of machine, which may denote either 
all that exhibits a unified structure or be restricted to what enjoys functional 
unification. Qua machines, clocks can be viewed either as paradigmatic examples of 
mechanical structure or as typical artefacts, that is as functional devices. Of course, as 
they lack any metaphysical principle of substantial unification, they cannot count as 
substances in the way that living machines can. However, it would be incorrect to 
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infer that they do not enter the metaphysical scale of the perfection of beings. In fact, 
the functional, artefactualist consideration of clocks dominates in many of the same 
contexts in which the concept of perfection also becomes prominent. As I have 
shown, this is no mere coincidence; on the contrary, it agrees with recent suggestions 
that Leibniz‟s concept of perfection – at least when specified in terms of relative 
perfection – involves a teleological component that is also essential to the functional 
concept of machine.80 
Remarkably, even the two-clock analogy has finally confirmed the point 
repeatedly made above. If we are to compare and evaluate the structures of different 
clocks, we must consider their relative perfection, which consists in their functionality 
to some intended purpose and not in the brute fact that all machines, however poorly 
constructed, follow the laws of nature.81 My suggestion is therefore that, in most if not 
all of its occurrences, the clock analogy is not meant by Leibniz to be in any relevant 
sense reductionist. In his view, even the teleological account of living bodies indeed 
appears inseparable from describing them in terms of machines. In the end, teleology 
need not be reconciled with mechanism, for Leibniz‟s clocks show that functions and 
purposes are already intrinsic features of the machine. 
 
Appendix: Leibniz’s Remarks on Henry Sully82 
 
Remarques sur le Discours de Mr. H. S. touchant la maniere de gouverner les Horloges à 
Pendule & les Montres à Spirale. 
 
Il seroit fort à souhaiter qu‟il y eût un Ouvrage sur l’Horlogerie, propre à faire 
entendre toute la Pratique de l’Art, non seulement dans le principal, qui est la Mesure du 
Tems, mais encore par rapport à l‟accessoire, qui consiste en quantité de jolies 
inventions pratiquées par les Maîtres de l‟Art. L‟Auteur de ce Discours, qui a joint la 
Theorie à la Pratique, & qui a encore le talent de s‟exprimer assez bien, y seroit trés-
propre. 
La partie Arithmetique, par rapport à la Denture, a été bien traitée en Latin par 
MR. OUGHTREAD. 
Ce qui appartient au Réglement des Pendules, c‟est à dire des Poids en vibration, a 
été bien expliqué par MR. HUGUENS premierement dans un Discours Flamand, qu‟il 
fit imprimer lors qu‟il donna au public les premieres Pendules; & puis plus amplement 
& plus entierement dans son Ouvrage Latin, de Pendulis, où il rend raison de la Cycloide. 
Mais il y auroit encore quelque chose à dire de la Nature des Vibrations des Ressorts, dont 
l‟égalité est verifiée par celles des Cordes touchées, qui rendent toûjours le même ton, 
quand elles sont également tendües. 
Ce fut environ en 1674. qu‟on fit paroître dans le Monde le premier Ressort 
spiral réglant la Montre par ses vibrations. Je fus alors à Paris, où MR. HUGUENS fit 
executer cette invention par MR. TURET fameux Horloger. MR. HOOK luy fit une 
querelle là-dessus, prétendant dans un Ecrit public d‟avoir déja fait auparavant une 
Montre réglée par les vibrations d’un Ressort; Mais on n‟avoit encore point vû de Montres 
de sa façon, au moins avec un Ressort vibrant spiral. Un François nommé MR. HAUTE-
 
 
 
Society and Politics                                                                              Vol. 11, No. 2(22)/November 2017 
169 
FEUILLE intenta même un procés au Parlement de Paris à MR. HUGUENS, prétendant 
que c‟estoit son invention, mais il fut debuté. 
Il y a des Horloges à Pendule d‟une espece toute particuliere, ou [sic] le Poids 
vibrant ne va pas en allant & retournant, mais toûjours d‟un même côté. Ces Horloges ont 
cela de particulier, qu‟elles vont sans bruit, & ont été recherchées quelquesfois par 
ceux, qui manquent de sommeil et veulent avoir des Horloges dans leurs Chambres, 
qui ne les empêchent pas de dormir. MR. HUGUENS en a fait un Discours, qui n‟a pas 
été imprimé; où au lieu de Cycloide il a employé une espece de Solide parabolique pour en 
rendre les vibrations égales. 
Lorsque MR. HUGUENS publia son Ressort vibrant à spirale, je publiay un peu 
après dans le JOURNAL DES SÇAVANS un autre Principe d’égalité, qui n‟est pas phisique 
[sic], comme est la supposition de l‟égalité des vibrations des Pendules ou des Ressorts, 
mais purement mécanique, consistant dans une parfaite Restitution de ce qui doit vibrer, 
puisqu‟alors les Vibrations sont égales, parcequ‟elles sont justement les mêmes. MR. 
HOOK en écrivant contre MR. HUGUENS dit, qu‟il avoit aussi eu la même pensée que 
moy, mais qu‟il avoüoit de ne l‟avoir point fait paroître. J‟ay pensé quelquesfois à faire 
executer cette Invention, qui promet des nouveaux avantages assez considerables; 
Mais j‟ay toûjours manqué de l‟assistance d‟un bon Maître, qui eût une bonne volonté 
d‟y travailler; les Ouvriers ordinaires, sur tout en Allemagne, n‟ayant point d‟envie de 
s‟écarter de leur routine. Cependant une Montre ou Horloge, faite de cette maniere, 
pourroit se passer de la Fusée, & iroit de même, quand on en redoubleroit le Poids ou la 
force du premier Mobile. Elle seroit aussi plus propre aux voyages de mer que l’Horloge à 
Pendule. 
Par rapport aux Ressorts à spirale, dont on se sert dans les Montres de poche, il 
seroit important d‟examiner, combien l‟Air a de l‟inflüence sur les Vibrations d‟un tel 
Ressort, & particulierement, combien le froid & le chaud en changent l’égalité. 
Entre les Causes, qui changent la justesse de l‟Horloge ou de la Montre vulgaire, 
est aussi le Tems, qui se perd en les remontant, lorsqu‟elles sont arrêtées pendant ce 
tems là, comme il arrive ordinairemant; Car le tems de la remonte n‟est pas toûjours le 
même: Mais des bonnes Pendules, & d‟excellentes Montres ont, ou peuvent avoir une 
construction, suivant laquelle elles continuent d‟aller, pendant qu‟on les remonte. 
Dans la Comparaison de la Resistence de l’Air aux Vibrations du Balancier des 
Montres, avec la Resistence que l’Air fait aux Oscillations des Pendules, il semble qu‟il faudroit 
rabattre quelque chose, par ce que le chemin du Poids, qui va & vient, est plus grand 
que celuy du Balancier. 
Il est vray, que la Pendule a beaucoup plus de part au gouvernement de 
l’Horloge, que le Ressort à spirale, n‟en a au gouvernement de la Montre. Outre la preuve 
qu‟on en a alleguée, en voicy une autre tout aussi sensible; C‟est que l’Horloge à Pendule 
ne sçauroit aller, à moins qu‟on ne mette la Pendule en vibration; mais la Montre va par 
sa propre force, & fait vibrer le Ressort spiral. 
Les longues Pendules à Secondes font des Vibrations assez égales, par la raison, 
qu‟un si petit Arc de Cercle d‟un si grand Rayon ne sçauroit guéres être distingué 
sensiblement d‟un Arc de Cycloide. Cependant il faut avouër, que le premier Mobile & le 
Roüage ont encore quelque inflüence sur le Tems de la Pendule, puisque dans l’Axe de sa 
vibration elle tombe dans la Denture, & agissant sur les dents qui resistent, ne sçauroit 
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vibrer avec une liberté entiere, ce qui fait aussi, que la Pendule est un peu avancée par 
une grande augmentation de la force du premier Mobile. 
On pourroit régler la Figure de la Fusée des Montres par l’Experience, en bandant 
le Ressort avec des Poids, & marquant par quelque addition de poids, jusqu‟où le Ressort est 
bandé; & les Diametres des endroits de la Fusée seront réciproquement comme les Poids, 
qui peuvent tenir le Ressort dans l‟état, où il est en agissant sur cet endroit de la Fusée. 
Je ne veux point parler icy de la Reduction du Tems égal au Tems apparent, 
cependant je reconnois, que si la Machine de l’Horloge ou de la Montre faisoit cette 
Reduction par elle même, suivant ce que l‟ingenieux Auteur de ce Discours nous fait 
esperer, ce seroit quelque chose de trés-beau & de trés-commode. 
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